2. Was Al-Batalyawsῑinfluenced by Ismaili Doctrines
Because of the important place that his work al-Ḥadāʻiq occupied in the milieu of Jewish thinkers, Ibn al-Sῑd received the famous name of the philosopher confirmed in the Islamic West. According to studies and analyses specializing in Andalusian philosophy, it has been affirmed by the majority that Ibn al-Sῑd was subject to intellectual and doctrinal influences. According to some scholars, Al-Fārābῑ and Iẖwān al-Safāʻ played a great role in his philosophical formation and in the orientation of his respective thoughts.
The similarities between the works of these authors and those of Ismaili thinkers provide approximate and arguably proof of the influence of the two on the other and the cultural and intellectual interaction between their predecessors and successors.
The influences were carried out either directly or indirectly, according to the requirements of the natural law of civilizations' interactions. This is the inevitable law.
The fact that Ibn al-Sῑd's predecessors were the majority or certain of an Ismaili denomination, it was therefore very obvious that he drew from the same sources of the heirs of this heritage.
The various ancient thoughts disseminated in the Islamic world in general bore within them the marks and models of the Šῑ'ite and Ismaili philosophical systems.
It was widely spread and known by the scholars of Islamic civilization that the dissemination of ancient knowledge has a single objective, which is that of the continuity of knowledge and the development of human knowledge.
As a philosopher and successor of the Ismailis, Ibn al-Sῑd did not escape the historical demands by which he too played the same role of transmission and influence with some of his successors.
He is undoubtedly the messenger carrying within him the knowledge of his masters and predecessors that was transmitted to his successors, to Ibn Rušd and Ibn al-'arabῑ.
To be subjected to such intellectual influences and exchanges is an inevitable natural law of the history of peoples. For this reason, it can be emphatically said that Kitāb al-Ḥadā'iq is a valuable witness to the impact and influence exerted on its author Ibn al-Sῑd, and then on the majority of his successors.
2.1. Was There Any Direct or Indirect Contact with Any of Their Disciples
The doctrinal influence of Ismailism reached its peak between the tenth and twelfth centuries. As a branch of Šῑ'ism, Ismailism recognizes the authority of the Imam who is God's representative on Earth. The imam is both the spiritual and political leader of the community. He is infallible, and because of this, he is the one and only legitimate interpreter of Scripture. A hierarchy often builds parallels between metaphysical, theological and social structures.
Ismaili cosmology can be described as neo-platonic in its entirety. It seems that Neo-Platonism was introduced into Ismaili doctrine in a brief and rapid manner in the ninth century, by al-Nasafi (d. 943).
This Neoplatonism serves to explain the relationship between the One and the existence of multiplicity. Ismaili thinkers tried to modify this Neoplatonic system by starting the process of emanation from the level of the Intellect and not from the degree of the One.
Emanation has therefore been thought of as something that occurs from the Intellect to the Soul, from the Soul to Nature, and so on up to the elementary qualities. The hierarchy of emanations is a hierarchy of value and perfection.
2.2. Are There Any Arguments to Support the Observation of This Impact and Influence
Ibn al-Sῑd followed the distinction between origination from the One and emanation from the Intellect. He thus names the One in terms of theological advantages (al-Barῑ') as the Superior or the Transcendent.
From the One, through the origination, arises the First Intellect, and from it, through emanation, arises the Second Intellect. From the Second Intellect emanates the Third Intellect, at the origin of the material world; the emanating process is completed with the tenth Intellect.
Such a 'philosophical' hierarchy corresponds very well to the vision of the cosmology of Al-Fārābῑ and Ptolemy according to which the Universe was made up of nine or ten concentric spheres, organized in hierarchical order.
This hierarchy represents a harmony of the universal organization. The whole is decided by the creator (al-Bārῑ'). This hierarchical order is very well accomplished when each of these creatures occupies his natural degree and the place willed and granted by the Creator.
This order and harmony must be found in the universe, in each of its elements and more precisely in the generations from the mineral to the animal through the plant embodied in the human being, and then they will find their expression in his body (human body).
2.3. In These Various Modes of Hierarchization of Beings, Where Does Man Fit in, How can He Know His Place
As the dominant creature of the animal generation, man is dressed representing all the generations below him. It is made of mineral and vegetable elements, but through its soul it takes part in the divine world. It is in the direction of the latter that his end is stretched and oriented.
Since man is the only creature endowed with rational power, he therefore has a power of choice. It also needs to be directed to its natural place. His guidance and guidance is provided by a religious order, message, or law, which is the link between the spiritual and material worlds and the link between the Creator and man.
For Ibn al-Sῑd, as for his predecessors, including the Ismailis, this mission of guidance occurs through the people regulating human affairs and making the divine and natural law effective. According to the divine, the order of hierarchy and universal harmony, in Ibn al-Sῑd, consists of ten degrees, in which each of these creatures has a reason for being in the degree above its own.
Ibn al-Sῑd himself gives a graphic example of this hierarchy, as do others, in a diagram representing a higher degree and others of lower sandstone.
3. What Are The Representative Passages with Such an Impact in His Work al-Ḥadāʻiq
The terms and (terminology) appear in several paragraphs of al-Batalyawsῑ's kitāb al-Ḥadāʻiq, especially in the first chapter. Example: (sababawwal- aw'illa-tu al-'ilal).
In addition, several synonyms existed for certain terms and concepts, such as: (ibdā= inbi'āṯ=ẖalq).
At the beginning of this first chapter of his work, al-Batalyawsī exposes the problem of the divine essence (God), the first principle, the first cause and the cause of causes.All beings have emanated from the first principle through the intermediary of another being. The closest to the first principle is the cause of the one who succeeds it. They are nine intellects, called 'the seconds separated from matter'. The first, emanating from the first cause and without intermediary, is the second, then three, four, five, six, seven, eight, and nine. Each intellect is the cause of the one who succeeds it.
The world of the four elements is called the 'sensible world'. All causes have emanated from the First Principle 'God' which is the cause of all causes.
In this way, everyone needs him and the existence of each of them depends on him. On the other hand, He does not need any cause or anything else to exist.
His unity [Essence of God] diffuses in his creatures as the light of the sun diffuses in bodies. It protects the entity and the existence of its creatures. The latter [creatures] exist only with its existence [the first cause]. Without it, all creatures would disappear, and none would survive. She is the light of the world. It is unique. It has no partners or equals. It is imperceptible but perceives all things, as the Qur'an says: "...
He knows what is on Earth and at the bottom of the sea. Not a leaf falls without his knowledge. There is not a single speck in the darkness of the Earth, a green or withered sprig that is not inscribed in the evident Book".
<a></a>21<a></a>He, the giver of existence that is not limited by time or space.
According to Batalyawsī, the notions of 'time' and 'space' have a specific meaning that forms the basis for understanding attributes, essence, and their differences from those of creatures:
Time (al-zamān): Time is the duration of sensible things (maḥsusāt).
Eternity (al-dahr): Eternity is the duration of intelligible things (ma'qūlat).
God is not limited by time or space, and He is not influenced by eternity. It is the first degree in existence. He is existence itself. No one is like it, is associated with it, neither in its existence nor in its attributes. It cannot be located. He is the Creator of the sensible and the intelligible.
He is unlike any of his creatures, as they are defined by time, space, and movement.
The divine attributes and their logic according to al-Batalyawsῑ. In his analysis, Al-Batalyawsī resorted to the interpretation of Qur'anic verses mentioning attributes. According to him, it is impossible to compare God to his creatures. His divine attributes are different from those of man.
The description of the Creator as Audient (Samī') and Seer (baṣīr) has a different meaning than that of man. His description does not resemble any of his creatures and none is like him.
The resemblance exists only at the level of the terms in their structure and not in their content and meaning.
Man hears and sees through senses that are in addition to his essence, unlike God who hears and sees through his essence itself. There is no resemblance between the created and the Creator.
The resemblance is in the pronunciation of the terms, but never in the psychological and existential meaning.
The attributes are similar in their name and not in their meaning. They are shared by the term and not by the meaning. Man sees with his eyes and hears with his ears. But God is indefinable and unimaginable.
Ibn Sid took a new step in his analyses and his study of other opinions when he said: "The divine attributes have a specificity that concerns God alone". Batalyawsī asserts that the divine attributes are indescribable, alluding to the conflicts caused by the divergences and misunderstanding of the verses by some thinkers.
The divine attributes are specific to God, but the description and naming always remain approximate and untruthful.
Example of the previous terms:
1) Yā-ğawād- lā - yabḫul (Munificent and not miserly)
2) Yā-ḥalīm -lā -yaʿğal (the most gentle one who does not lose patience)
3) Yā-ʿālim- lā-yağhal (scholar who knows nothing)
In spite of the degree reached by man's attributes, he is qualified by his impatience, in a hurry, Avar and ignorant in his judgments, unlike God who is indescribable by his creatures.
In his talk, Batalyawsī proceeds to the analysis of attributes within a framework of admiration and insistence for demonstrative science based on main foundations drawn from theological science and profound realities of the study of logic and philosophy.
On this principle of logical analysis, the relative and existing difference between human and creature attributes (al-ṣifāt) is clarified.
Exemple: yā- Ḥalīm (Patient); yā-Ğawād (Munificent); yā-ʿālim (Savant).
The distinction is therefore made by the meaning of the terms chosen and not by their imposed structure. The way in which God knows and understands things is different from that of men.
To achieve this distinction, Batalyawsī resorts to the interpretation of Qur'anic verses.
For example, in the following verse: "fa-atā – bunyān-a-hum min-a al-qawʿidi"
Translation: "But Allah has destroyed and devastated the basis of their construction. Thus, the ceiling collapsed above them. The punishment came to them from where they did not expect it".
Batalyawsī says: that the verb 'atā = to come' is an act of 'acting' and not a verb that means that God moves to come, that is: God does not describe himself as his creatures who move in time and space. The meaning of the verb 'atā = to come' is a metaphor.
Batalyawsī enters into a linguistic and philosophical debate with certain grammarians and theologians and even with philosophers who maintain the apparent meaning of the Qur'anic verses without interpreting them (bila ta 'wīl). Moreover, because of the qualification of the verb 'to rise' = 'qā'iman' as a 'verb of state', Batalyawsī detects their linguistic, grammatical and philosophical incompetence. It is for this reason that he has called them the atheists, the ignorant impure, as in the following verse:
«šhahid-Allahu- anahu- la- ilāha -ila- huwa- wa- al- malā‘ ikat – wa- ūlū - al ʿilm–qā’im-an bi- l -qist - la- ilāha - ila – huwa- al- ʿazīz al- hakīm ».
"Allah testifies, and also the angels and the gifted with knowledge, that there is no god but Him, the Maintainer of Justice. There is no divinity except him, the mighty, the wise".
Their explanation of the verb 'to rise' (qā'iman) in the above verse, sums up their shortcomings in theological sciences and their incompetence in Qur'anic interpretation.
The Qur'anic verses are of two kinds:
1) unequivocal (muḥkam)
2) equivocal (mutašābih)
The word (qā'iman) expresses movement, mobility and instability and this concerns man and creatures more than the divine essence.
The explanation of these thinkers was refuted by Batalyawsī because the state verb "to lever" qā'im-an' was misinterpreted in describing the Creator by being-like qualities.
"Goderrant, moving and mobile": an unacceptable word by Batalyawsī. Misunderstanding proves their incompetence.
The noun to rise (qā'im), according to Batalyawsī, is an act without movement, without time or space. God does not move. For this reason, Ibn al-Sīd qualifies these grammarians as misguided and ignorant of the rules of the Arabic language.
To raise 'al-qiyyām' by which God has described His essence in this verse does not mean to rise, to stand, but the meaning is 'to do' and 'to protect things'.
According to Batalyawsī, the attributes are of two kinds:
The first is to eliminate the association and resemblance between two subjects. In this case, we describe one by qualities that differ it from the others. E.g., If there are three students named Zayd.
If we say, "Zayd is coming," the person we are talking to will not understand which Zayd we are talking about. In this case, he asks for more details to make the difference.
A second intended for praise or denigration. The interlocutor in this case does not need to be glorified, as in the following example if one says, "I met my noble teacher or the noble teacher."
The divine attributes, according to Batalyawsī, are therefore of the latter kind, but God differs from all his creatures. Each of his descriptions is unique. No one is associated with it or similar.
It is for this reason that the praise in al-Batalyawsī is in three kinds:
1) Excess or exaggeration, that is to say, to go beyond measure, truth, in one's words and actions.
2) Moderation, reduction, restrained attenuation that keeps away from any excess.
3) Negligence (5th chapter), Attitude of one who lackscare, attention and vigilance. (Lack of knowledge).
4) The first two are not allowed in the praise of the divine essence, but we are unable to glorify its essence by the right way of praise. We are powerless in linguistic, metaphorical and imaginative matters to achieve a description that lives up to its essence. It depends on our weakness as creatures created by our Creator.
All our eloquent and imaginative expressions are powerless, and our description is only a rough metaphorical image.
The names of the divine attributes are as follows:
1) Vivant (ḥay),
2) Savant (ʿālīm),
3) Mighty (qādir),
4) The Oyant (samīʿ),
Their divine meaning is absolutely contrary to what is implied by these names common in our world among human creatures. Our eloquence is powerless to imagine the divine essence in its own image. Our field of vision is overcast and obscure. He prevents us from penetrating into the reality of his essence - may he be exalted as a mighty God - of all his creatures.
Man does not provide a complete description that corresponds to the proper image of his divine essence, for he is above all imagination. God is Mighty and is higher than all of His creatures. Its essence is indescribable and unmistakable.
What is significant here is that a hierarchy existed in the early epochs of humanity, and that the underlying principle of the whole system was the concept of obedience.
All Ismaili authors agree on this point. Thus, the hierarchy made by Ibn al-Sῑd in his work al-Ḥadā'iq, clearly shows obedience to a high authority living in the divine world, that is to say that the degrees of natural beings are equivalent in their hierarchization in the order of divine intellects.
Ibn al-Sῑda has the same Ismaili opinion: authority and obedience are therefore two related concepts.
Ismaili thought has influenced Islamic thought in all its theological, philosophical and political aspects. It is part of the great esoteric current that has known the history of Muslim thought. It encourages intellectual speculation within the framework of the Islamic faith. This Ismaili current developed a certain religious science based on hermeneutics.
The various metaphysical concepts adopted by Ibn al-Sīd, either Ismaili such as (Initiator = mubdi'), the hierarchy of beings, the concept of cyclical time and numbers, or Neoplatonic such as the emanation of the world, the One and multiplicity, etc. prove at least his knowledge of Ismaili (Neoplatonic) culture, if not even his membership in one of the philosophical circles.
The period before Ibn al-Sῑd is characterized by the appearance and development of the cosmopolitan spirit of the school of Aristotle, Baghdād and humanistic urban culture (Yahya Ibn 'Adῑ and his disciples) and many others.
This period was characterized by Louis Massignon as the Ismaili century. A proliferation of Ismaili works in both Arabic and Persian arose, describing the theosophy of Ismailism.
As we have mentioned in our thesis work, the Ismaili doctrines as well as the theory of the ten Intellects in al-Fārābī have been taken up, adopted and deepened by several thinkers, including Ibn al-Sῑd, who is part of it in the Islamic West.
3.1. AL-Ḥadāʻiq
In the first chapter of Al-Ḥadā'iq, by Ibn al-Sῑd, exposes the notion of:
1) The First Cause,
2) The First Intellect,
3) The Cause of Causes (al-Mawğūd al-awwal) which is (al-Sabab al-awwal) of the existence of all beings.
As for his degree, the First Being is the highest of all. He does not need another being to exist. Being in the first degree of perfection of being, He cannot have associates. Its essence is unique and differs from any other being.
If the First Being is perfect, He cannot share some similarities with an opposite. The First Being is distinguished from all beings by the Unity of His essence. It is more fitting for him than for any other to be designated as the One (al-Wāhid). At this first stage, we can see that Ibn al-Sῑd starts from a definition of the First Being, from which he logically deduces His Attributes.
Ibn al-Sῑd's definition of God resembles that of his predecessors in general and that of Al-Fārābῑ in particular, but his vision is different from that of Aristotle: "Being as Being". God, in Aristotle, is pure thought or Intellect in action, contrary to what Ibn al-Sῑd assigns: God is the (Cause and Creator of the world). Ibn al-Sῑd's conception, close to that of al-Fārābῑ, differs from that of Plotinus.
Ibn al-Sῑd followed a period very marked by many controversial debates and opinions about the Divine Unity and the creation of the world. These theological and philosophical debates produced two opposing parts of thought: rationalist, having an abstract idea of God on the one hand, and anthropomorphic, describing God with human attributes.
The Sunni Muslims put the Divine Unity beyond all discussion, although they give God Attributes. For this reason, Ibn al-Sῑd, like his predecessors, tried to preserve harmonization with official religious doctrines.
Monotheism, according to his doctrine, was founded on the divine essence. The First Being is the most perfect, He is unequalled, unparalleled, He is unique in himself.
The thought of Ibn al-Sῑd is similar to that of Al-Fārābῑ on the one hand, and that of Iẖwān al-Safā' on the other, which affirms that the logic of interactions proves its influence indirectly through that of the Ismailis. The latter often imagine Deity as being beyond human intelligibility and all imaginations and descriptions.
As was observed, the Ismailis, unlike their successors, do not directly link the Attributes to Deity, for they believe that these characterize created beings.
According to contemporary studies and research, some claim that Ibn al-Sῑda was influenced by Ismaili works and that he drew on the sources of the masters of the Ismaili faith either directly or indirectly.
Regarding the theory of the creation of the world, Ibn al-Sῑd, like the majority of his predecessors. His doctrine has Neoplatonic and Ismaili roots.
Emanation is the perpetual radiance of a light and a thought that comes from the One.
The Neoplatonic theory is reported and represented by al-Fārābῑ, whose nine heavens, in the latter, constitute the ladder of descent, while the ten Intellects form the path of ascent. In Iẖwān al-safā', this theory remains closer to Plotinus, but Ibn al-Sῑd remains close to all by giving it another aspect.
Influenced by the immense ancient philosophical heritage, Ibn al-Sῑd proceeded to found an astrological theory according to which the stars govern the lower world. He also describes the evolution of physical beings by stating that minerals were produced by the mixture of the four elements (earth, water, air and fire). Plants are made from a mixture of several minerals and elements. Animals come from a mixture of several plants, minerals and elements. Finally, a final mixture makes the man appear.
According to Ibn al-Sῑd, the world is made up of nine main spheres, the center of which is the Earth. The ninth sphere was added by al-Fārābῑ, probably influenced by the work of Ptolemy. The first system of spheres has only one body which moves in a circular motion.
The second has only one body that moves in a circular motion surrounding the first system. All the systems that follow are hierarchical in this way.
The raw material is made up of a hierarchy ranging from the most complex to the simplest. Contrary to Aristotle's theory of spherical motions, he believed that each intelligence could produce all the motions proper to its sphere.
The Ismailis, previously, made some modifications to the Neoplatonic scheme. Thus, the first Intelligence (al-'aql al-awwal) does not emanate from God, but appears through Order (Amr) or the Logos (Kalima) in the act of Establishment (Ibdā').
From the first Intelligence begins the emanation (fayḍ) of beings. In the Kitāb al-Ḥadā'iq, Ibn al-Sῑd adopts the same procedure with the modifications made by all his predecessors. He explains that the emanation of the world has produced the things of this world in a hierarchy of perfection. He thus affirms that the human being, through his substantialization, can reach the level of the Soul and the substance in a circular trajectory. This conception of the world is close to a Platonic idea. Why then circular?
3.2. The Circle
In the various eras of human civilizations, the circle is considered an intriguing and powerful symbol. He had a striking presence in the world of ancient and modern times. Its shape is flawlessly defined. It has no beginning, no end, no angle. It includes other shapes such as the point and the line.
From there, it is associated with beauty and perfection, completeness and unity, timelessness and infinity. It is for this reason that the circle plays an important role in philosophical and mystical reflections, as well as in all the cyclical changes in nature that have been contributed to its symbolic appearances.
In his work al-Ḥadā'iq, Ibn al-Sῑd adopted some aspects of this figure by emphasizing the importance of its roles to clarify his theory of emanation. He presented diagrams representing his own thinking.
As we can see from his chapters, the symbol of the circle and cyclical conceptions figure prominently in Ismaili thought and in their successors. Their (Ismaili) teachings are important for understanding the context in which Ibn al-Sīd and his predecessors developed their distinct circular visions of existence.
Ibn al-Sῑd's cosmology is inspired by the thought of the heir of his various Muslim Neoplatonic predecessors. From their inheritance, he deduced the role of the circle by considering Intelligence as revolving around the One.
He took up al-Fārābῑ's theory of emanations on the one hand and Iẖwān al-Safā's number theory on the other. By associating the two doctrines based on the system of ten Intellects, he represents circles nesting into each other.
Ibn al-Sῑd continues his study and affirms that God is the principle: the One (Wāḥid), the First (al-Awwal), the Agent (al-Fāʿil) and the Scholar (al-ʿalīm). He is the Most High Creator (Bāri') of man. What place does the latter occupy in kitāb al-Ḥadā'iq?
3.3. The Man
Man, according to Ibn al-Sῑd, has multiple faculties.
1) The sensitive faculty (al-quwwa al-hāssa)
2) The imaginative faculty (al-quwwa al-mutaẖayyila)
3) The appetitive faculty (al-quwwa al-nuzū'iyya)
4) The nutritive faculty (al-quwwa al-ġāṯiyya)
5) The rational faculty (al-quwwa al-nāṭiqa).
All these faculties are organized in a hierarchical order.
Happiness for all beings consists in attaining perfection. In Ibn al-Sῑd, as in his predecessors al-Fārābῑ and Iẖwān al-Safā', union with the agent Intellect can take place through the intellect: it becomes the source of all philosophical knowledge. This union can also be brought about by the imagination: it is then the source of revelations and inspirations.
Man's speech and rationality distinguish him from other creatures (animals) that possess intellectual faculties and principles. The attainment of the intellect ('aql) makes the human being truly substantial. These rational principles are the foundation and condition necessary for the attainment of perfection.
The philosophy of Ibn al-Sῑd takes up the metaphor of light expounded by Plato, Plotinus and other philosophers and later taken up in the hierarchy of intellects and spheres by al-Fārābῑ expounded in his treatise the ideas of the inhabitants of the ideal city, studied and analyzed by his commentators.
Human beings have the choice to perfect themselves or not. Because of this, he deserves a reward or punishment. His primary objective must be to perfect his faculties:
Rational/Speculative (al-nāṭiqa al-naẓariyya), are the faculties that can perceive happiness with certainty. He must develop his practical (al-'amaliyya), appetitive (al-nuzū'iyya), imaginative (al-mutaẖayyila) and sensitive (al-hassāsa) faculties in order to attain happiness.
When human beings seek to achieve this goal, everything they do is good. When he deviates from this goal, everything he does is wrong. Ibn al-Sῑd presents this vision as the beginning of a connection or an entry into a junction (al-ittiṣāl).
Ibn al-Sῑd's thought resembles that of his predecessors such as al-Fārābῑ, but unlike all philosophers, he is characterized by a different and particular reflection specific to his person.
Ibn al-Sῑd, like his Ismaili predecessors and many others, distinguished the science of the Sages (Hukamāʻ) from that of others. People are different categories. They differ in their level of understanding and their openness to the divine and the natural. The Sages possess a science based on reliable demonstrations (barāhῑn), while the others are content with representations (tamaṯṯulāt).
Ibn al-Sῑd strongly supports the idea of a true sage by the definition of Aristotle and Plato :
"This one is the true philosopher according to Aristotle and Plato and their master."
Figure 1. Al-Ḥadā’iq, p. 53
"Those who do not have these qualities, according to them, are not philosophers. For this reason, Aristotle says: 'The goal is not only to learn, but to learn and practice and you will be the best and virtuous bound to the laws of nature.'"
Figure 2. Al-Ḥadā’iq, p. 53.
Ibn al-Sῑd's goal may have been to transfer this Wisdom to the Andalusian world in the Islamic West. Philosophy is the mother of the sciences, the virtue which includes all the virtues. The true philosopher, according to Ibn al-Sῑd, is the one described by Aristotle and Plato.
Ibn al-Sῑd developed a theory of wisdom that was integrated by the philosopher and the sage. The proper and pure qualities of nature, of wisdom. Thus, the role of the perfect man is more important. It deserves to be more than any other.
These terms refer to one who has attained such perfection. They are synonymous with the Greek definition of one who masters the art of pure philosophy. The perfect man is both a philosopher and a sage.
In his work, Ibn al-Sῑd develops an Ismaili problem, according to which human beings always need perfection in order to reach the most ultimate degree of (Divine Guide) for the realization of the virtuous City, as is the case with Plato al-Fārābῑ and many others.
Ibn al-Sῑd's philosophy should rather be called perfectionist philosophy (or philosophy of perfection). Indeed, man in the world with his perfection is none other than the perfect man or the philosophical man. He is the Sage who is also a ruler or an Imām as among the Ismailis.
These arguments concerning the necessity of perfect men and the qualities of the philosopher or the sage, approximate the thought of Ibn al-Sῑd to all other thoughts drawn from the Ismaili doctrine.
To develop the notion of the perfect man, Ibn al-Sῑd was inspired by his Ismaili predecessors.
The latter often present themselves as the heirs of the Wisdom of the Greek philosophers. The Imām is the only one who has the privilege of interpreting the faith and unveiling the esoteric meaning of revelation. This stems from their conception of creation. Even if the Ismaili theory of creation is neo-platonic, the Imām occupies the same position as the philosopher who is the only one capable of explaining the world of Ideas to citizens.
For Plato, it is the Philosopher's duty to lead and show society the best way to live. It is the presence of the Philosopher-King that ensures the existence of a Republic that leads to happiness, to a good and wise life.
In a similar way, Imāma is a religious necessity to maintain the unity of the faith and for the ideal of religion to be realized. Without the guidance of the Imām, the unity of the faith is not possible and religion becomes a source of controversy among theologians.
For the ideal city to be realized, political power and philosophy must meet.
In these Platonic terms, modified by the Ismailis and taken up by the predecessors of Ibn al-Sῑd, only the Imam or the philosopher, the sage, can reach and understand the World of Ideas as perfectly as possible. The qualities required of the Imām and the Philosopher are similar. Both were chosen by God.
God rewarded the philosopher with various qualities and intelligence. In the same way, among the Šiʿites or Ismailis, God has blessed humanity with the Imāma, which is transmitted in a different way.
Similarly, Imāms and philosophers have a knowledge of the afterlife that they transmit to their followers in order to achieve perfection.
The philosophy of Ibn al-Sῑd carries within it a perspective for regaining order. The philosopher compares the hierarchy of the natural members of the world with that of the spiritual beings emanating from the First Cause. Each degree is simultaneously directing and directed, except that which is above or below the hierarchy. Above all, there is the creator of all things, below, there is raw material and the elements. This hierarchy resembles the human body, in al-Fārābῑ where all the members help each other to maintain life. In Ibn al-Sῑd, the conception of the perfect or supreme man, like that of Abū Hātim al-Rāzῑ, is strongly Ismaili. In the latter, there is an intellectual hierarchy among men. The latter need each other. They have to learn from each other. The Creator God bestows upon some His Wisdom and Mercy, elects them from among all His creatures, sends them as messengers to others, and informs them through His revelation by favoring them through Prophecy. In this way, they can guide humanity in both their material and religious life.
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